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CURTAILMENT OF COURT AWARDED ATTORNEYS'
FEES IN PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION
The United States is one of the few countries in the world which requires

each party in federal litigation' to pay its own attorneys' fees. 2 Although
English courts allow an award of fees to the prevailing party in a suit,3
American courts will not ordinarily allow such an award absent statutory
authorization. The American rule, barring the shifting of attorneys' fees to
the prevailing litigant, originated during the eighteenth century; the first

relevant statutory mention is contained in an Act passed in 1789 regulating
the processes of the courts of the United States. 4 The Act required that federal courts follow the procedure for attorneys' fees practiced by the state in
which they were sitting. In the middle 1800's, Congress decided to standardize the fees that could be charged to a losing party in federal litigation.
The resulting court costs and docketing statute5 limited the amount a
victorious litigant could charge the losing party for attorneys' fees. The
1. Treatment of the state courts' procedures is beyond the scope of this article. For
a discussion by one court, see Culbertson v. Jno. McCall Coal Co., 495 F.2d 1403 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974) (application of the Erie doctrine allowing
state procedure to govern the grant or denial of awards of attorneys' fees in ordinary diversity cases). See also 6 J. MooRE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTncE 54.77[2], at 1712-13
(1974).
2. See Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. L.
REv. 1216, 1223-24 (1967).
3. See Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 851-72 (1929); Stoebuck, Counsel Fees
Included in Costs: A Logical Development, 38 U. CoLo. L. REv. 202, 204-07 (1966).
4. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93.
5. Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 80, 10 Stat. 161. The statute provided in relevant part:
[in] lieu of the compensation now allowed by law to attorneys . . . the following and no other compensation shall be taxed and allowed...
Fees of Attorneys, Solicitors, and Proctors. In a trial before a jury, in
civil and criminal causes, or before referees, or on a final hearing in equity
or admiralty, a docket fee of twenty dollars: Provided, That in cases in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, where the libellant shall recover less than
fifty dollars, the docket fee of his proctor shall be but ten dollars.
In cases at law, where judgment is rendered without a jury, ten dollars,
and five dollars where a cause is discontinued.
For scire facias and other proceedings on recognizances, five dollars.
For each deposition taken and admitted as evidence in the cause, two dollars and fifty cents.
A compensation of five dollars shall be allowed for the services rendered
in cases removed from a district to a circuit court by writ of error or appeal
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Supreme Court has interpreted this statute throughout the years to forbid
awards other than those expressly allowed in it,6 and the statute has thus
provided the substantive basis for the present American rule. 7
Nevertheless, court costs and docketing statutes have never acted as a
complete bar against awarding attorneys' fees to the prevailing party, for
Congress has enacted certain statutes containing fee shifting provisions. 8
6. See, e.g., Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714
(1967) (counsel fee not awarded prevailing party in suits involving Lanham Act violations); Flanders v. Tweed, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 450 (1872) (award of counsel fee not
permitted against treasury agent who illegally seized plaintiff's property); The Baltimore,
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 377 (1869) (award of $500 counsel fee to prevailing party not permitted in admiralty court).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1920, 1923(a) (1970). Section 1920, Taxation of costs, provides:
A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs the following:
(1) Fees of the clerk and marshall;
(2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(3) Fees and disbursements. for printing and witnesses;
(4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for
use in the case;
(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title.
A bill of costs shall be filed in the case and, upon allowance, included in the
judgment or decree.
Section 1923(a), Docket Fees and Costs of Briefs, provides:
Attorney's and proctor's docket fees in courts of the United States may be
taxed as costs as follows:
$20 on trial or final hearing (including a default judgment whether entered
by the court or by the clerk) in civil, criminal, or admiralty cases, except that
in the cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the libellant recovers
less than $50 the proctor's docket fee shall be $10.
$20 in admiralty appeals involving not over $1000;
$50 in admiralty appeals involving not over $5000;
$100 in admiralty appeals involving more than $5000;
$5 on discontinuance of a civil action;
$5 on motion for judgment and other proceedings on recognizance;
$2.50 for each deposition admitted in evidence.
8. See, e.g., Amendments to Freedom of Information Act § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a
(g)(2)(B) (Supp. Feb. 1975); Bankruptcy Act § 64(b)(1), 241-44, 11 U.S.C. §§ 104
(a)(l), 641-44 (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §H 9, 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e),
78r(a) (1970); Consumer Credit Protection Act § 130(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970);
Copyright Act ch. 391, 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1970); Organized Crime Control Act of 1970
§ 901(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1970); Education Amendments of 1972 § 718, 20
U.S.C. § 1617 (Supp. I1, 1973); Norris-LaGuardia Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 107(e) (1970);
Fair Labor Standards Act § 16, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970); Water Pollution Prevention
and Control Act § 2, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (Supp. 1m, 1973); Servicemen's Readjustment
Act § 5(c), 38 U.S.C. § 1822(b) (1970); Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 204, 42
U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970); Tit. VII § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970); Fair
Housing Act of 1968 § 812, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970); Communications Act of 1934
§ 206, 47 U.S.C. § 206 (1970). For a complete listing of statutes containing fee shift-
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These statutory provisions for fee shifting either make the award mandatory,
as is the case with antitrust laws, 9 or discretionary, as exemplified by the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.10 In addition to specific congressional provisions
for fee shifting, another group of exceptions to the American rule grew out of
the courts' equitable powers to allow attorneys' fees "in particular situations,
unless forbidden by Congress . ...11 There are two well-established situa-

tions under which awards have been granted without statutory authority.
First, courts have awarded fees for "willful disobedience of a court order...
as part of a fine to be levied on the defendant,"' 12 or when the losing party
has "acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons
ing provisions, see Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 260
n.33 (1975).
9. Section 15 of the Clayton Act, for example, provides that:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore . ..and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of the suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). Other statutes providing for mandatory fee shifting include the
Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921 § 309, 7 U.S.C. § 210(f) (1970); Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act of 1930 § 10, 7 U.S.C. § 499g(b) (1970); Railway Labor

Act of 1926 §§ 1,2(c), 2(d), 45 U.S.C. § 153(p) (1970).
10. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides inrelevant part:
Inany action commenced pursuant to this subchapter, the court, initsdiscretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the United States shall be liable for costs
the same as a private person.
42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970). The Supreme Court has held that, in actions brought
under this section, Congress intended that successful plaintiffs should normally recover
unless exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises,
Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
Other statutes which make such awards discretionary include the Securities Act of 1933 § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970) (cost
may be assessed against either pa:ty when the court believes suit or defenses were
without merit); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1970)
("the court may, in its discretion . . . assess reasonable . . . attorneys' fees, against

either party litigant"); Copyright Act § 116, 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1970) (reasonable attorneys' fees may be awarded in favor of the "prevailing" party in an action for copyright
infringement); Serviceman's Readjustment Act § 1822(b), 38 U.S.C. § 1822(b) (1970)
(reasonable attorneys' fees may be awarded to the successful party).
11. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). As
a part of their general equity power, the federal courts have always been able to
award attorneys' fees when they deemed such awards appropriate. "Plainly the foundation for the historic practice of granting reimbursement for the costs of litigation other
than the conventional taxable costs is part of the original power of the chancellor
to do equity in a particular situation." Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161,
166 (1939). See also Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973). For an excellent discussion
of the origin and development of the court's inherent equity power to make such awards,
see Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City S. Ry., 28 F.2d 233, 240-46 (8th Cir. 1928),
rev'd, 281 U.S. 1 (1930).
12. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967),
citing Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 426-28 (1923).
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. ... ,,3 The second situation in which nonstatutory fees have been allowed
involves the "common fund" exception. 1 4 Under this doctrine, a person preserving, recovering or enriching a fund or property for the benefit of himself
and others is allowed to obtain attorneys' fees either from the fund itself or
from the person receiving the benefit.'
In recent years, many lower federal courts have awarded successful
plaintiffs' 6 attorneys' fees in public interest litigation' 7 based on a third exception to the American rule. Under this third theory, when a plaintiff brings
suit under a federal statute to vindicate the rights of others as well as himself, he is considered to be acting as a "private attorney general" and thus
should be awarded attorneys' fees to encourage such suits.' s
In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,' 9 the Supreme
13. F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974), citing
Vaughn v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530-31 (1962). For other cases decided under this
exception, see Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399 (1923) (contempt
of court); Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 186 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1950) (vindication of seniority and employment rights violated by collective bargaining agreement);
Cleveland v. Second Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 149 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1945) (fiduciary
put to expense in defending suit based on unfounded charges of maladministration).
14. The common fund exception is also referred to as the common benefit exception.
For an explanation of the change in terminology, see text accompanying notes 67-68
inf ra.
15. For cases decided under the common fund exception and the development of this
exception, see notes 62-72 & accompanying text infra. See also United States v.
Equitable Trust Co., 283 U.S. 738 (1931); Harrison v. Perea, 168 U.S. 311 (1897);
Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885).
16. The term "successful" is applied to the prevailing party who has the judgment
entered in his or her favor. However, in order to be considered the prevailing party
a litigant does not have to succeed on all claims, as long as some of them are successful.
See 6 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
54.70[4], at 1306-07 (1975).
17. Public interest litigation has been comprehensively discussed in Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 301 (1973). The author
mentions three characteristics of litigation brought in the public interest: 1) the issues
are regarded by the majority of society as being of extreme importance, as evidenced
either by strong legislative concern or constitutional protection; 2) the final decision affects a large number of persons beyond the plaintiff; and 3) the action is brought by
a plaintiff acting voluntarily, i.e., "the crucial element is that the plaintiff does not have
an obligation under the law to initiate the type of lawsuit that has been brought." Id.
at 305. Perhaps another characteristic is that the relief sought by the plaintiff in such
litigation is often not money damages; thus the cost of the suit far outweighs the monetary return possible.
18. This theory was first announced in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390
U.S. 400 (1968):
A Title II [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] suit is thus private in form only.
When a plaintiff brings an action under that Title . . . he does so not for himself alone but as a "private attorney general", vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.
Id. at 401-02. See pp. 154, 158 infra.
19. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
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Court abruptly terminated further use of the private attorney general
exception. In 1970, plaintiffs, the Wilderness Society, the Environmental Defense Fund, and the Friends of the Earth, seeking to halt construction of the
trans-Alaska pipeline, 'brought suit for declaratory and injunctive relief against
the Secretary of the Interior on the grounds that the Secretary intended to issue
right-of-way and special land use permits for the pipeline in violation of the
Mineral Leasing Act of 192020 and the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969 (NEPA). 21 When the district court granted a preliminary injunction
against the Secretary, 2 2 the state of Alaska and Alyeska Pipeline 23 intervened
on behalf of the Interior Department. Following three years of litigation and
environmental studies by the principle parties, Congress enacted the TransAlaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 24 which amended the width requirements
of the Mineral Leasing Act and thereby allowed Alyeska to proceed in its
construction of the pipeline. The Act also declared that no further action
under NEPA was required in order for construction of the pipeline to begin.
With the merits of the case thus resolved, 25 the environmentalists applied
to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for
an award of attorneys' fees, 26 claiming that they were entitled to reimbursement for the costs resulting from the successful litigation of a suit in
the public interest. 27 The court noted that there was no applicable statutory
provision under the Mineral Leasing Act permitting such an award, and
found that the facts of the case did not justify an award under either of the
two generally approved exceptions to the American rule against fee shifting. 28 However, the court did find a basis for fee shifting under the private
20. 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1970). The crux of plaintiffs' allegation was that Alyeska's
permits violated the width requirements of the Act.
21.
22.
23.

42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-35, 4341-47 (1970).
Wilderness Soc'y v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970).
The permits were to be issued to a consortium of oil companies which owned

Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. The consortium sought to transport Alaskan oil to markets in the lower 48 states.
24. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-55 (Supp. 1973).

25. Following the issuance of the mineral and right-of-way permits, the district court
dissolved its preliminary injunction and refused to grant a permanent injunction. On
appeal, the decision of the district court was reversed on the issue of the Mineral Leasing Act. 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U S. 917 (1973).
The appeals
court declined to decide the NEPA issues because of their complexity, the need for
a rapid decision, and the fact that the construction of the pipeline would be effectively
enjoined because of Mineral Leasing Act violations. The subsequent passage of the

Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-55 (Supp. 1973), permitted
construction to proceed.
26. Wilderness Society v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
27.

The environmentalists claimed over 4,500 hours of attorneys' time was spent in

the litigation. Id. at 1032.
28. See notes 11-15 &accompanying text supra.
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attorney general exception and, after suggesting standards for the award of.
fees to the environmentalists on that basis, remanded the case to the district
29
court for a determination of the amount of such fees.

The Supreme Court reversed and specifically refused to employ the
private attorney general theory absent statutory fee shifting authority. 30 This
article will examine the implications of this limitation on the use of the
private attorney general exception in public interest litigation. Additionally,
it will examine the history and trends in the use of the common fund
exception to the American rule and its possible expansion in light of the
decision in Alyeska.
I.

THE

RISE AND FALL OF THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY
GENERAL EXCEPTION

Prior to its demise in Alyeska, the private attorney general theory had
emerged as a third nonstatutory basis upon which to award attorneys' fees.
The private attorney general concept was initially used by the Supreme Court
29. The fee should represent the reasonable value of the services rendered, taking into account all the surrounding circumstances, including, but not limited
to, the time and labor required on the case, the benefit to the public, the skill
demanded by the novelty or complexity of the issues, and the incentive factor.
495 F.2d at 1036.
Although the Department of the Interior and the state of Alaska were defendants
along with Alyeska Pipeline, only Alyeska was made to bear the burden of the costs
incurred by the environmentalists. The court felt that attorneys' fees were barred from
being awarded against the United States by 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1970), and that it would
be unfair to award any of the costs against the state of Alaska. 495 F.2d at 1036 &
n.8. Since the costs could not be spread among the defendants, the court determined
that Alyeska should pay only one half of the plaintiffs attorneys' fees and that the
Wilderness Society should absorb the other half. Id. at 1036.
30. The Court stated:
It appears to us that the rule suggested here and adopted by the Court of Appeals would make major inroads on a policy matter that Congress has reserved
for itself. Since the approach taken by Congress to this issue has been to carve
out specific exceptions to a general rule that federal courts cannot award attorneys' fees beyond the limits of 28 U.S.C. § 1923, those courts are not free to
fashion drastic new rules with respect to the allowance of attorneys' fees to
the prevailing party in federal litigation ....
421 U.S. at 269. See also note 41 infra for an account of some of those cases decided
by the lower federal courts which the Alyeska Court stated had been erroneously decided
using the private attorney general theory to award fees. One case deserves special note'
here. In Sims v. Ames, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd, 409 U.S. 942 (1972) (fees
awarded in section 1983 reapportionment suit "to remove impediments to pro bono
publico litigation" benefiting plaintiff and his class and effectuating strong congressional
policy), fees were awarded by the district court using the private attorney general exception. The 1972 Supreme Court's summary affirmance was justified by the Alyeska majority on the grounds that the district court had available alternative bad faith grounds
upon which to base its decision. 421 U.S. 270 n.46.
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in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.31 In Piggie Park, plaintiffs
brought suit under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,82 alleging racial
discrimination by a chain of restaurants. Although Title II allowed a
discretionary award of fees, 33 the Court held that in order to encourage
those suffering racial discrimination to bring suits in the public interest under
the Civil Rights Acts, attorneys' fees would be awarded routinely "unless
special circumstances would render such an award unjust."'3 4 Persons bringing suits to implement important congressional policy were termed private
attorneys general by the Court.
This language seemed to set the stage for courts to award attorneys' fees
whenever a citizen acted as a private attorney general and furthered an
important congressional policy. The fact that the Piggie Park decision was
based on a statute which allowed for discretionary fee shifting constituted the
only impediment to the application of this theory in a variety of other public
interest cases in which there was no statutory provision for awarding
attorneys' fees.
The Supreme Court's decision two years later in Mills v. Electric AutoLite Co.,35 however, appeared to remove even that stumbling block. In
Mills, minority stockholders successfully sued a corporation for a violation of
proxy regulations under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.36 The Act was
silent on the question of attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court, although basing
its decision to award counsel fees on the common benefit exception to the
American rule,3 7 stated that an award of fees was permissible when the
litigation conferred a substantial benefit on members of an ascertainable
class, when the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit made it
possible to make an award that would operate to spread the costs proportionately among them, and when permitting others to derive full benefit from the
plaintiff's efforts without contributing equally to the litigation expenses would
serve to enrich others at the plaintiff's expense.38
31. 390 U.S. 400 (1968). See note 10 supra. Originally, the term "private attorney
general" was used to refer to one who had standing to bring a suit to challenge federal
government action. See Associated Indus. Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.),

vacated, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).

The phrase has now come to refer to a civic-

minded taxpayer who brings suit to prevent or correct official misconduct. See Dawson,
Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88 HAv. L. Rav. 849,
888 (1975).

32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) (1970).
33. See note 10 supra.
34. 390 U.S. at 402.
35. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
36. 1.5 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1958), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
37. See 396 U.S. at 392-97.

38. Id.
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In spite of the fact that the Mills Court did not adopt the private attorney
general theory as the basis for its decision,3 9 lower federal courts lost no time
in applying a broad reading of the combined Piggie Park-Mills doctrine 40 to
a host of public interest cases. 4 1 But while many commentators hailed the
combined Piggie Park and Mills decisions as the beginning of a new era in
public interest litigation, 4 2 at least one commentator as early as 1973 saw
39. There has been some disagreement among commentators as to the basis for this
decision. At least one author stated that Mills was decided under the private attorney
general theory, while another disagreed, arguing that it was determined under the common benefit theory. Compare Note, Awarding Attorneys' Fees to the "Private Attorney
General": Judicial Green Light to Private Litigation in the Public Interest, 24
HASTNGS L.J. 733, 741 (1973) with Note, Sierra Club v. Lynn: The Shifting of Attorney Fees in Private Environmental Suits, 5 ENVIRONMENTAL L.J. 175, 179-80 (1974).
However, the Alyeska Court categorized Mills with its other common fund decisions.
See p. 158 infra.
40. According to one commentator:
Read together the two cases stand for the broad principle that attorney's fees
should be granted to successful plaintiffs in order to effectuate important social
policies. We will refer to this principle as the "Piggy Park-Mills doctrine."
Nussbaum, supra note 17, at 321.
41. See, e.g., Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1972) (fee awarded in section 1982 civil rights case to enable plaintiff to vindicate a public right); Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1974) (fee awarded in fourteenth amendment reapportionment case in which important public policies were effectuated); Cooper v. Allen, 467
F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1972) (fee awarded in section 1981 civil rights case to encourage individual injured by racial discrimination to seek judicial relief); Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971) (fee awarded in section 1982 civil
rights case to enable individuals to act as private attorneys general); Taylor v. Perini,
503 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1974) (fee awarded in section 1983 prisoner rights case
to encourage persons to vindicate important rights); Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 498 F.2d
143 (8th Cir. 1974) (fee awarded in sections 1981 and 1983 civil rights case to allow
plaintiff to act as a private attorney general and vindicate important congressional policy); Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974) (fee awarded in section
1983 right to travel and welfare case because plaintiff benefited a significant class, vindicated a federally protected right, had insufficient monetary interest to bring suit and
could not rely on the state attorney general to protect her rights); La Raza Unida v.
Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (fee awarded in environmental protection and
housing assistance case brought under Department of Transportation Act of 1966 and
various federal housing statutes because of the strength of the congressional policy, the
number of people benefited by the litigants' efforts, and the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement). See 421 U.S. at 270 n.46 for additional cases which the
Alyeska court held were wrongly decided using the private attorney general theory.
42. See, e.g., King & Plater, The Right to Counsel Fees in Public Interest Environmental Litigation, 41 TENN. L. REv. 27 (1973); Nussbaum, supra note 17; Comment,
Balancing the Equities in Attorney's Fees Awards: Losing Plaintiffs and Private Defendants, 62 GEO. L.J. 1439 (1974); Comment, Award of Attorney's Fee in Alaska:
An Analysis of Rule 82, 4 U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. REV. 129 (1974); Note, Awarding Attorney and Expert Witness Fees in Environmental Litigation, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1222
(1973); Note, Private Attorney General Fees Emerge From the Wilderness, 43 FoRDHAM L. REV. 258; Note, HASTINGs UJ., supra note 39; Fees Awarded under Equity to
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the dangers inherent in the broad language used by the Court in Mills and
accurately forecast the Alyeska result.43
In Alyeska, the Court buttressed its conclusion with three major arguments. First, it analyzed the docketing fees and court costs statutes to
demonstrate that the American rule is statutory in origin and that absent
congressional directive, fee shifting should not be allowed. 44 Having erected
this statutory barrier, the Court was then forced to distinguish the two
nonstatutory exceptions which it had sanctioned in its previous decisions. The
bad faith doctrine was only briefly discussed in Alyeska as part of the
inherent power of the courts to make an award in the interests of justice.
However, this exception had been explained by the Court in previous cases
as a part of its original equity power received from the English chancery
courts. 45 The common fund exception was distinguished by the Court as a
permissible construction of the fee statute rather than a true exception to the
statute. The Court simply determined that this theory allowed shifting of the
fees, not to the defendant, as is proscribed by the statute, but to the
benefited class, about which the statute is silent. The only time a defendant
could be made to pay attorneys' fees would be when he or she could spread
them to the beneficiaries of the action, thus passing the costs of the litigation
46
on to others.
Second, noting the number of statutes which Congress has enacted
containing specific fee shifting provisions, 47 the majority concluded that
those statutes which did not have such provisions were to be regarded as posEnvironmental Interest Litigants for Promoting Substantial Public Interest, 51 N.D.L.
REV.530 (1974).
43. Logically, one of two things must happen: either judicial discretion to grant
fees on policy grounds will result in universal fee shifting from the successful
party, or the courts will withdraw to the traditional position, denying any fee
transfer without specific statutory authorization. Mills represents an uneasy
half-way house between these two extremes.
Comment, The Allocation of Attorney's Fees After Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 38

U. Cm. L. REv. 316, 336 (1971).

See also 6 J.

MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE

54.77[10], at 24-25 (Supp. 1974).

44. See notes 5-7 & accompanying text supra.
45. See note 11 supra. The English chancery courts, whose purpose was to do justice, had the power to grant costs according to the facts of each case. See Kansas City
S. Ry. v. Guardian Trust Co., 281 U.S. 1 (1930).
46. Although this doctrine has undergone considerable expansion in the 90 years
since its birth in Board of Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881), a vital ingredient of this method of fee shifting has always been the ability of the party who must
pay to pass these costs on to the appropriate benefiting class rather than forcing
the defendant or a nonbenefiting party to absorb those costs. See notes 62-81 and accompanying text infra for discussion of this doctrine and cases decided under it.
47. See note 8 supra.

1975]

Curtailment of Attorneys' Fees

sessing a negative implication proscribing fee shifting. 48 Finally, the Alyeska Court raised the question of which public interest cases should qualify for
fee shifting. If courts allowed fee shifting in all cases, the American rule
would be rendered meaningless. If only some of the cases were to qualify,
courts would be forced to make value judgments ;49 the majority questioned
how courts would decide to which litigants fees should be awarded and
under what conditions. 50 Additionally, the Court was concerned about what
method should be used to determine how much money to allocate for fees.5 1
Congress, not the judiciary, was seen as the appropriate body to make
determinations with respect to the creation of further exceptions to the
American rule.
It is readily apparent that had the Alyeska Court wished to do so, it could
have avoided overturning the private attorney general exception. Alternate
grounds existed for the Court to deny fees. For example, it might have
determined that the appeals court wrongly shifted the burden of paying
attorneys' fees to Alyeska, since in reality it was the Department of the
Interior which had directly violated the law by issuing the permits in
48. Interestingly, Justice Stewart, dissenting in Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier
Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 723 (1967), believed that this same congressional silence
in certain statutes evidenced an implied consent to shift fees. He reasoned that if Congress had not wanted the courts to authorize fee shifting in those silent statutes, it would
have said exactly that. See note 73 infra for a discussion of Fleischmann.
49. In a country with as many diverse groups as ours, what is of interest to one sector
of the public may not be of interest to another. See note 87 infra.
50. 421 U.S. at 263-64. Certain statutes award fees to the prevailing party. See note
10 supra. Others make such awards to prevailing plaintiffs only. See, e.g., Fair Labor
Standards Act § 16, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970) ("The court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action."); Ship Mortgage Act
§ 30, 46 U.S.C. § 941(c) (1970) ("Upon judgment for the plaintiff in any such suit,
the court shall include in the judgment an additional amount for costs of the action and
a reasonable counsel's fee, to be fixed by the court.").
51. Courts have used many different factors in arriving at an award of "reasonable"
attorneys' fees. See, e.g., note 29 supra; City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d
448, 470 (2d Cir. 1974) (starting point of every award of attorneys' fees must be calculation of number of hours attorney spent on the case); Ranger Ins. Co. v. Algie, 482
F.2d 861, 864 (5th Cir. 1973) (hours spent by attorney in preparation of a case are
of dubious value; custom of the place is a relevant consideration as well as the briefs
filed, the record, the difficulty of appeal, the result obtained, and the experience of counsel); Milstein v. Werner, 58 F.R.D. 544, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (benefit conferred is the
most important factor to be used in determining fee award). For a detailed discussion
of guidelines recommended in determining fee awards by two different courts, see Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974); Lindy
Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 16669 (3d Cir. 1973).
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question. 52 Alternatively, the Alyeska Court might have found that the
environmentalists had not in fact vindicated a strong congressional policy.
The rapidity with which Congress amended the provision in question to
comply with Alyeska's requirements and the fact that a six-year congressional study of the original bill made no mention of the width requirements
whose violation was the crux of plaintiffs' complaint against Alyeska
might have been seized upon by the Court as evidence that the Mineral
Leasing Act width requirements were not strong congressional policy concerns. Thus, in at least two ways the Court might have denied fees without
destroying the private attorney general theory.58
Instead, it seems clear that the Supreme Court wished to call an abrupt
halt to the broad reading of the Piggie Park and Mills decisions. The Court
emphasized that the Piggie Park holding was made under a discretionary fee
shifting statute and that therefore there had been congressional authorization
for the award. Piggie Park had simply held that the fee shifting provision
should be awarded routinely absent special circumstances' 4 The A lyeska
Court referred to Mills, without discussion, as one of a number of cases which
had been decided under the common fund exception to the American rule,
thus dispelling any notion that it considered Mills to have been decided
under the private attorney general exception.
Justice Marshall dissented in Alyeska, sharply criticizing the majority for
its narrow view of the judiciary's power to award fees. While Justice
Marshall admitted that the Court had always acknowledged Congress' power
to limit awards of attorneys' fees, he argued that since the Court had
interpreted the common fund exception to the American rule more and
more generously through the years,5 5 it should not abandon this trend.
Although disagreeing with the majority's narrow statutory interpetation,
Justice Marshall admitted that the Court had a legitimate concern5 6 in ascertaining what standards to use in awarding fees to private citizens acting in
the public interest. 57 He determined that three criteria should be used in
52. See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 16, 18, Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
53. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 10, 27-30, Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
The brief suggests several alternate ways of
distinguishing Alyeska from other cases in which awards were made under a private attorney general theory.
54. See note 10 supra.
55. 421 U.S. at 273 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See text accompanying notes 62-72
infra for a discussion of the increasingly liberal approach the Court has taken in common fund cases.
56. 421 U.S. at 273-74.
57. Arriving at a set of uniform standards upon which such awards could be made
appears to be one area of disagreement among the many commentators and courts which
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awarding fees to private attorneys general. Fees should be shifted to the
defendant when:
(1) the important right being protected is one actually or necessarily shared by the general public or some class thereof; (2) the
plaintiff's pecuniary interest in the outcome, if any, would not
normally justify incurring the cost of counsel; and (3) shifting that
cost to the defendant would effectively place it on a class that
benefits from the litigation."
have addressed the subject. See note 51 supra for the views of several courts. Some
commentators have stated that fees should be awarded only to prevailing plaintiffs. See
Nussbaum, supra note 17, at 335 & n.151; Comment, U.C.L.A.-AAsKA L. REv., supra
note 42, at 178. But see Dawson, supra note 31, at 904-05, for conditions under which
fees should not be awarded against defendants. Others have advocated that fees be
granted to plaintiffs whether or not they actually prevailed. See Comment, GEO. L.J.,
supra note 42, at 1443. Commentators also have discussed how much money to award
and how best to arrive at this determination. See Dawson, supra note 31, at 922-29;
Nussbaum, supra note 17, at 336; Comment, U.C.L.A.-ALAsKA L. REv., supra note 42,
at 174-78; Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts,
122 U. PA. L. REv. 636, 701-12 (1974). Determination of to whom the fees should be
awarded and under what conditions seemed to depend upon the societal interest each
commentator felt needed to be advanced by the fee shifting provisions. Other commentators have started with the interesting proposition that the purpose of fee shifting should
be to provide for the airing of previously unrecognized interests so that the parties representing each point of view would be heard equally in court. They argue that fees should
be shifted from that party representing the previously unrecognized viewpoint, regardless
of whether that party was the plaintiff or defendant and regardless of whether or not
that party prevailed in the litigation. See Terris, The Hard Years Ahead for Public Interest Law, 4 JuRIs DOCTOR July/Aug. 1974, at 24; Comment, U. PA. L. REv., supra, at
674-81.
58. 421 U.S. at 285 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See notes 87-89 & accompanying
text infra for the majority's discussion of Justice Marshall's first criterion. Justice Marshall's second criterion, although not discussed by the majority, was addressed by the
dissenting justices in the Wilderness Society opinion, in which Judge MacKinnon stated
that the major, albeit hidden, premise in the decision to award fees in that case was the
fact that "oil companies are prosperous, appellants are poor, and therefore oil companies
should finance both sides of this litigation." 495 F.2d at 1042 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). Indeed, one commentator has noted that the taking of money from a corporation
to award it to a public interest law firm may violate the equal protection clause. The
corporation would have to pay because of the financial status of its opponent, not because of any actual principle of justice. See Comment, U. PA. L. REV., supra note 57, at
671-2 & n.219. But see Comment, U.C.L.A.-ALAsKA L. REV., supra note 42, at 177 n.
278. Another answer to the question of where to obtain attorneys' fees and a justification
for taxing the public for maintaining public interest law firms rather than the defendant
can be found in Comment, U. PA. L. REv., supra note 57, at 678-79. The author points
out that the federal government is subsidizing large corporations in their litigation costs
by allowing them to deduct up to 50 percent of such costs. Thus the public interest
firms, supported by private contributors who seldom qualify for such large scale deductions, are additionally disadvantaged and should be reimbursed by the public treasury.
This theory has been used by one commentator to support his contention that public
interest law firms should be allowed to proceed in forma pauperis, thereby forcing the
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The majority, however, declined to accept Justice Marshall's criteria. It
viewed his third qualification for fee shifting, the necessity of spreading the
costs of the suit to the benefiting class, as a part of the common fund
rationale59 and thus inapplicable to a decision to award fees under a private
attorney general theory. 0 The Court distinguished Justice Marshall's application of the fund doctrine from others which it had endorsed by stating that
in those previous cases
[tihe benefits could be traced with some accuracy, and there was
reason for confidence that the costs could indeed be shifted with
some exactitude to ,those benefiting. In this case, however, sophisticated economic analysis would be required to gauge the extent
to which the general public, the supposed beneficiary, as distinguished from selected elements of it, would bear the costs. 6
The Alyeska Court thus not only eliminated the private attorney general
exception but also sought to foreclose Justice Marshall's inclusion of Alyeska
within a broadened reading of the common fund doctrine.
II.

THE COMMON FUND EXCEPTION

Although the Alyeska Court rejected Justice Marshall's attempt to combine the private attorney general theory with an expanded version of the
common fund exception, the Court did not explicitly overrule expansion of
this latter doctrine. -It must be determined, then, if under the common fund
exception, any possibilities remain for the award of attorneys' fees to private
citizens who bring suits in the public interest.
The common fund theory originated in the 1881 case of Trustees v.
Greenough,6 2 in which the Court allowed an award of attorneys' fees to a
plaintiff who, by his successful litigation, had created a fund which benefited
others. The plaintiff brought suit on behalf of himself and all other bondholders against the trustees who were to secure the bonds. The action
public to absorb the costs of litigation. See Comment, Proceeding In Forma Pauperis
in Federal Court: Can Corporations Be Poor "Persons"? 62 CALIF. L. REy. 219, 248-49
(1974).
59. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
60. 421 U.S. at 264-65 n.39. As outlined by the court in La Raza Unida v. Volpe,
57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972), the first lower federal court utilizing the private attorney general theory in an environmental case, the criteria for determining such an award
were three-fold: 1) strong congressional policy must be effectuated; 2) a large class of
people must be benefited because of this effectuation; 3) the necessity of and financial
burden of private enforcement must be such as to make the award essential. Id. at 98.
The appeals court's Wilderness Society decision followed these general guidelines in arriving at the decision to grant an award of fees. 495 F.2d at 1030.
61. 421 U.S. at 265 n.39.
62. 105 U.S. 527 (1881).
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resulted in the recovery of trust assets in which all the bondholders shared.
Not providing for a fee award, the Court felt, would unjustly enrich the
beneficiaries who would receive the benefits of the litigation without having
to pay for them.
In Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 63 the common fund concept
established in Greenough was held to include persons suing on behalf of
other named plaintiffs rather than on behalf of a class. The plaintiff in
Sprague had established her rights to a trust as an individual and in so doing
had established the rights of fourteen other persons who had not been parties
to the suit. Although the plaintiff had not established a true fund which
could be taxed to pay the attorneys' fees, but had merely protected an
existing fund, the Supreme Court held that under the common fund doctrine
64
it was unnecessary that a new fund be established by the litigation.
The Supreme Court's decision in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.6 5 allowed
fee shifting in stockholder suits when no monetary recovery was sought.
The successful enforcement of the statutory policy of the Securities and
Exchange Act 66 was considered by the Court to be a substantial enough

benefit to justify such an award even in the absence of a fund. 67 Mills thus
marked the first use of common benefit rather than common fund terminology. 68 The Mills Court was extremely vague, however, in establishing guidelines to determine when an ascertainable class existed to whom the benefits
might be distributed. Additionally, the Court neither stated what degree of
statutory enforcement was necessary to constitute a "substantial benefit" nor
limited its holding to stockholder suits. 9
Thus the path was opened for an award of attorneys' fees in a common
benefit case not involving a stockholder's claim. In Hall v. Cole,70 the
Supreme Court awarded the plaintiff attorneys' fees under the common
benefit rationale of Mills. A union member brought suit claiming that his
union had violated his right of free speech as guaranteed under the Labor63. 307 U.S. 161 (1939).
64. Id. at 166-67.

65. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
discussion of the case.

See text accompanying notes 35-39 supra for additional

66. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78hh-1 (1958),
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78hh-1 (1970).

as

67. 396 U.S. at 396.
68. For an excellent discussion of the common fund and common benefit rationales,
cases decided under them, and the concept of fee awards based on these theories, see
Dawson, supra note 31.
69. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
70. 412 U.S. 1 (1972).
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Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. 71 The Court held that the
vindication of his rights conferred a benefit upon himself and the other
members of the union, a benefit which should be paid from the union's
72
treasury.
The broad language of the Mills and Hall decisions, when read together,
appeared to allow for expansion of the common benefit exception to any
situation in which the benefits of the litigation could effectively be spread to
an ascertainable class which profited from the suit. 73 Therefore, at least until
the Court's discussion in Alyeska, the potential for a broadened version of
the common benefit doctrine under which fees could be shifted in public
interest litigation to the parties benefiting from the enforcement of federal
statutes seemed a real possibility. Indeed, some commentators saw the
private attorney general concept, at least under some conditions, as the
common benefit exception carried to its farthest extension.7 4 Justice Marshall in his dissent in Alyeska stated that he was
at a loss to understand how [the Court] can also say that this
independent power [to allow fee shifting under the common benefit
exception] succumbs to Procrustean statutory restrictions-indeed,
to statutory silence-as soon as the far from bright line between
"common benefit" and "public benefit" is crossed. 75
Although theoretical expansion of the common benefit doctrine to include
the public as the benefited class seemed possible, even before the A lyeska
decision the lower courts generally had not used the theory to apply to
situations in which the public as a whole had benefited from the plaintiff's
71. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 § 102, 29 U.S.C. §
411(a) (2) (1970).
72. 412 U.S. at 8-9. The treasury then had the power, however, to assess the union
members for this benefit.
73. One potential limitation to this doctrine is found in Fleischmann Distilling Corp.
v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967). In Fleischmann, the Supreme Court held
that an award of fees could not be granted to the prevailing party when the section of
the federal statute under which the suit arose was silent on the issue of fees, while other
sections in the same statute meticulously detailed the remedies available to the plaintiff.
Id. at 719-21. However, the Mills Court limited the holding in Fleischmann to suits
arising under the Lanham Act, under which Fleischmann was decided, and to other legis-

lation that similarly had extensive detailing of remedies available to plaintiffs. 396 U.S.
at 391.
74. See King & Plater, supra note 42, at 61-62 & n.169; Comment, U. PA. L. REv.,
supra note 57, at 667-8. Interestingly, the main difference between a joint reading of
Mills and Piggie Park, and Mills and Hall, is the same difference between the private attorney general theory and the common benefit theory-the ability to spread the costs to
the party benefiting from the litigation is still a necessity, albeit rather vague in its requirements, under the Mills-Hall common benefit theory, while it is eliminated in the
Mills-Piggy Park private attorney general theory.

75. 421 U.S. at 277-78 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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suit. Perhaps this was because the courts viewed the emerging private
attorney general theory as an easier and more direct exception under which
to fit their awards of fees. On the other hand, some courts believed that the
spreading of costs among the members of the public would not be feasible, 7 6
either because all members of the public did not benefit equally, 77 or
because the defendant was not the appropriate party to spread those costs to
the public beneficiaries. 78
The reason for the confusion and the parameters of possible expansion
which surrounded the joint readings of Mills and Hall become readily

apparent if one keeps in mind the three oblique criteria of the Mills
decision. 79 The Mills Court gave no indication of whether the three requirements were to be read narrowly or broadly. Thus if the criterion of ability to

pass the costs on to the benefiting party could be interpreted liberally, the
necessity of an exact fit between the benefited class and the class paying the

costs would be eliminated. In this way, an award of attorneys' fees with the
public as the benefited class could fall within the common benefit rationale.
76. See La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 96-97 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Bradley v.
School Bd., 472 F.2d 318, 327-29 (4th Cir. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 416 U.S.
696 (1974).
77. See discussion in Comment, U. Cm. L Rnv., supra note 43, at 333, in which the
author pointed out that in the common benefit case of Mills more than 50 percent of
the beneficiaries opposed the litigation that had presumably vindicated their rights. See
also Brief for Respondent, at 37, 81, Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421
U.S. 240 (1975), in which inequities in the fee shifting used by the Court in Sprague
are noted. Respondents asserted that even in the early court cases fee shifting did not
result in a perfect fit between the class benefited and the class which had to bear the
costs. For an example of a court's judicial gymnastics in trying to justify an award of
fees against the defendant using the common benefit doctrine when the defendant was
not able to pass the costs to the party which benefited, see Brewer v. Norfolk School
Bd., 456 F.2d 943 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972).
78. See Sierrra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp. 834, 851-52 (W.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd in
part, 502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974), in which the defendant housing developer was held
not to be in a position to distribute the costs of litigation which had resulted in the preservation of San Antonio's water supply to the one million residents in the San Antonio
area who had benefited from this preservation. 502 F.2d at 65. In Alyeska, Justice
Marshall attempted to show that the defendant oil companies could spread the costs of
the litigation to the public since their oil sales constituted 20 percent of the United States
market. 421 U.S. at 288 (Marshall, J., dissenting). It should be noted that the Wilderness Society court had taken a contrary view and held the common benefit theory to be
inapplicable:
mhis litigation may well have provided substantial benefits to particular individuals and, indeed, to every citizen's interest in the proper functioning of our
system of government. But imposing attorneys' fees on Alyeska will not operate
to spread the costs of litigation proportionately among these beneficiaries, the
key requirement of the "common benefit" theory.
495 F.2d at 1029.
79. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
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Indeed, this seemed to be the theory under which those who heralded new
possibilities for public interest litigation under an expanded version of this
doctrine were operating. 80 However, if the Mills criteria were read narrowly,
an exact correlation between the class which benefited from the litigation
and the class which was to absorb the costs of those fees would be regarded
as an essential requirement.
The majority in Alyeska was unwilling to afford the criterion of ability to
spread costs equally among the members of the benefiting class a liberal
interpretation. 81 Since the ability of a private defendant to pass the costs of
public interest litigation equitably to the public is a common problem in cases
such as Alyeska, it appears that this expanded version of the common
benefit theory would have scant utility after Alyeska. Possibly the only

defendant in a position to spread costs equally to the public for benefits
received is the federal or a state government. But absent statutory provisions,
suits against the federal government are not allowed,8 2 and the eleventh
amendment generally bars suits against state governments without their con-

sent.8 3 Even these limited possibilities, then, are of extremely narrow scope.
III.

Alyeska's

RELEVANCE TO PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION

Alyeska indicates that absent statutory' authorization, fee shifting will not
be allowed in public interest litigation unless bad faith or a benefit to an
easily ascertainable class can be demonstrated. The result is to transfer to
Congress the responsibility for making any changes in previously established
fee shifting policies. This result may well have the effect of discouraging
public interest litigation.
Certainly the Court's refusal to encourage public interest litigation8

4

has

80. See Note, HASTINGs L.J., supra note 39, at 741 & n.35; cf. Note, Reimbursement
for Attorneys' Fees from the Beneficiaries of Representative Litigation, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 933, 955 (1974). Justice Marshall, in his discussion of the Court's other common
fund cases, stressed the importance of avoiding unjust enrichment and of enforcing a
statute for the benefit of a class including the plaintiff. See 421 U.S. at 274-78. However, he devoted only a small part of his dissent to the issue of equitably spreading the
costs among the beneficiaries of the litigation. Id. at 288. See also note 78 supra. Although Justice Marshall also attempted to show that attorneys' fees under the common
benefit doctrine could be assessed against the defendant as opposed to being spread
to the beneficiaries, his argument was expressly rejected by the majority. See note 46
& accompanying text supra.
81. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
82. See Note, CORNELL L. REV., supra note 42, at 1246-54.
83. See, e.g., Edleman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); San Antonio Conservation
Soc'y v. Texas Highway Dep't, 496 F.2d 1017, 1026 (5th Cir. 1974).
84. For other recent cases in which the Supreme Court has narrowed those situations
in which public interest suits could be brought, see United States v. Richardson,
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some forceful reasoning behind it. Disallowing attorneys' fees in public
interest cases will discourage the introduction of new suits to an already
overcrowded court system, and refusing to empower the courts with authority
to grant fees in an additional area will save court time that otherwise might
be spent on such endeavors as a calculation of reasonable fees.8 5
The Alyeska decision also tcould be viewed as relieving the difficulties
which the Court might face in establishing standards for a change that has
such far-reaching legal implications in our society. An examination of the
majority's response to Justice Marshall's suggested first criterion, that of the
effectuation of an important right shared by the public, is instructive. That
criterion was the sine qua non in all cases decided under a private attorney
general rationale. 86 However, the fulfillment of this requirement was seen by
the majority as impossible -to determine objectively 87 unless all federal statutes were automatically assumed to be of great public importance.88 Also, the
majority's specific questions as to whether such fee awards should be granted
to the party which prevailed, or only to the prevailing plaintiff, and whether
418 U.S. 166 (1974) (standing denied to taxpayer who claimed refusal of executive
branch to reveal expenditures of CIA violated statement and account clause of Constitution); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (standing
denied antiwar activists who as citizens and taxpayers argued that membership of congressmen in the armed forces reserves was prohibited by the incompatibility clause of
the Constitution); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (plaintiff in class
action required to give individual notice to all identifiable class members irrespective of
size of class and to bear cost of such notice even if prohibitively high).
85. See Fleischmarn Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718
(1967), for the Court's comments on the time-consuming aspects of determining fee
awards. See also note 51 supra for the variability in criteria used by different courts
in arriving at such awards.
86. See cases cited note 41 supra.
87. The dissenting opinion of the three judges in Wilderness Society was cited by the
Court as evidence of the difficulty in determining what is of great importance to the
public. Judge MacKinnon stated that the Wilderness Society was preventing the effectuation of strong public policy. 495 F.2d at 1041 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). Judge
Wilkey likewise had strong doubts that the environmentalists were seeking to vindicate
a policy strongly supported by the public:
It is hard to visualize the average American in this winter of 1973-74, turning
down his thermostat and with a careful eye on his auto fuel gauge, feeling that
warm glow of gratitude to those public-spirited plaintiffs in the Alaska Pipeline
case.
Id. at 1042 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). Additionally, Alyeska asserted in its brief that the
width requirements of the Mineral Leasing Act were hardly an example of strong congressional policy. See note 53 & accompanying text supra.
88. Commentators have seen as one of the dangers inherent in such a broad expansion the fact that plaintiffs could bring nuisance suits for minor violations of statutes,
harassing defendants and clogging the courts. See Note, HASTINGS L.J., supra note 39, at
756. One suggested way to handle this difficulty would be to deny standing to plaintiffs
bringing such suits. See Nussbaum, supra note 17, at 333 n.146.
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the award of those fees should be discretionary or mandatory, are further
evidence of the difficulties the Court might have met in arriving at appropriate standards for such awards.8 9
The Alyeska decision is certain to be viewed by many as a giant step
backward in the field of public interest litigation. Yet the very wealth of
conflicting values, goals and opinions advanced by the courts and commentators on the question of fee shifting90 may be proof that it is preferable to
move with the deliberation and careful study of which Congress is capable 9 '
in an area that is obviously frought with so many difficulties and possessed of
so few clear cut answers.
Emily Sommers Roberts

89. See 421 U.S. at 264.
90. See Comment, U. PA. L. Rsv., supra note 57, at 648-655; Note, VAND. L REv.,
supra note 2, at 1231-33, for discussions on several different proposals for reform of the
American rule and the difficulties with each. See also note 57 supra.
91. In response to the Alyeska decision, Senator John Tunney, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, introduced legislation amending the Civil Rights Act of 1866 § 3, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970),
to provide for discretionary fee shifting to all prevailing plaintiffs "'[i]n any action or
proceedings to enforce a provision of sections 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, and 1981 of the
S. 2278, 94th
Revised Statutes, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 .... .'
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). Additionally, Senator Edward Kennedy, after a discussion of
the implications of the Alyeska decision, announced that he planned to introduce legislation dealing with fee shifting in cases involving federal administrative agencies. 121
CONO. REC. 8012-13 (daily ed. May 13, 1975).

